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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
VOTING STUDY: A PRELIMINARY
REPORT
JULIUS G. GETMAN,* STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG,** and JEANNE B. HERMAN***
I. INTRODUCTION
THE National Labor Relations Act provides that if a majority of employees
choose union representation, the union shall serve as the exclusive bargaining
agent for all employees in the unit.1 The decision concerning union representa-
tion is typically made in an election preceded by a campaign in which the
union tries to induce the employees to vote for representation and the em-
ployer tries to induce them to vote against it. The Labor Board, which con-
ducts the election, has devised elaborate and complicated rules governing
campaign behavior, particularly of employers.
Because of the number, complexity, and significance of the Board's rules,
it is common for the losing party to file objections to the election. In fiscal
1970, objections were filed in 1207 of 8437 elections conducted. 2 Each
objection, whether or not meritorious, involves considerable investigation,
frequently a hearing, a written report, sometimes an appeal to the Board and
sometimes a court case challenging the Board's decision. The cost of ad-
ministering such a system-the expenditure of time, money and personnel by
the government, by the union, and by the employer-is substantial. More-
over, although the normal remedy for a violation of the Board's campaign
rules is an election rerun, if the Board deems the violation sufficiently serious
it can order the employer to recognize and bargain with the union even
though the union lost the election.3 Thus the Board's rules concerning the
assumed impact of certain types of campaign tactics are of great significance
to employers and unions.
wVisiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Professor of Law, Indiana Uni-
versity.
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
*** Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois. The research described in
this paper has been financed by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
1 29 U.S.C. I 158(a)(5), 19(a) (1970).
2 35 NLRB Ann. Rep. 174-75 (1970).
s NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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Yet the Board has formulated its rules on the basis of untested assumptions
concerning the likely impact of employer and union conduct on employee free
choice. 4 The Board assumes that employees are highly attentive to, and
susceptible to being influenced by, the campaigns of both the employer and
the union, and, in particular, that employees are aware of and susceptible to
threats of retaliation if they vote for the union and to promises of benefit if
they do not. For the past three years we have been engaged in a field study
to test the validity of these and other assumptions.5 We are currently in the
data-collection stage, which was preceded by test studies of six Board-con-
ducted elections. This article reports on our test studies and discusses the
significance of our data and the research decisions that we have made.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
We use the panel technique, which has proved successful in studying voting
behavior in political elections.e The technique involves interviewing the same
voters at different stages of an election campaign. The researcher is able not
only to ascertain whether the proportion of voters intending to vote for each
party changed but also to identify and study those who changed their votes.
We conduct two interviews with a randomly selected sample of employees.
The first-wave interview is scheduled after the union card-signing drive7 but
4 See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S.
1204 (1971); Derek C: Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 46753, 88-90
(1964); Bernard Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev.
228 (1968); Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571, 582 (1970); Note, Behavioral
and Non-Behavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation Cases, 45 Ind. L.J. 276 (1970).
5 Previous field studies dealing with the impact of the preelection campaign are dis-
cussed in: Irving Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Organization,' 18
Labor L. J. 149 (1967); A Survey of Voters in National Labor Relations Board Elections
(unpublished report prepared by Political Science Department Research Analysts, San
Fernando Valley State College, for the Los Angeles, Orange Counties Organizing Comm,
AFL-CIO, 1968); Note, Examination of Two Aspects of the NLRB's Representation
Election: Employee Attitudes and Board Inferences, 3 Akron L. Rev. 218 (1970). An
unsuccessful study is discussed in Donald F. Roy, The Role of the Researcher in the Study
of Social Conflict: A Theory of Protective Distoriion of Response, 24 Human Organiza-
tion 262 (1965). Archival studies include: J.E. Drotning, The Union Representation
Election: A Study in Persuasion, 88 Monthly Lab. Rev. 938 (1965); Daniel H. Pollitt,
NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 209 (1963); J. L. Blackman, Relative
Severity of Employer Unfair Labor Practices, 22 Labor L. J. 67 (1971). These latter two
studies are discussed in Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, Bargaining Orders and
the Myth of NLRB Expertise, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev.-(1972) (forthcoming).6 See, e.g., Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld & William N McPhee, Voting: A
Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (1954); Paul F. Lazarsfeld,
Bernard Berelson & Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (3d ed. 1969); Angus Campbell
et al., The American Voter (1960).
71n order to get an election order a union must obtain cards designating the union
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before the company campaign has begun in earnest. We collect attitude and
demographic data about the respondents and determine their voting inten-
tions. The second-wave interview, which is conducted immediately after the
election, collects information both on voting and on perception of the issues
raised in the company and union campaigns.
M. RzLATIONSHPs Bziwmr VoTE AND DEMoGRAPHc AND JOB
CHARACTERISTICS, ATTITUDES AND THE CAMPAIGN
A. Introduction
The Board assumes that voting is significantly influenced by the campaign,
especially by employer threats and promises. If, however, voting behavior can
be predicted from data collected prior to the campaign, the specific content of
the campaign would appear largely irrelevant in shaping voting behavior.
Accordingly, we have attempted to predict votes on the basis of information
collected at the first interview.
B. Relationship Between Vote and Demographic and Job Characteristics
Demographic information collected at the first wave interview includes the
respondent's age, sex, marital status, race, education, and prior union mem-
bership of both himself and his family. Job-characteristic variables explored
include length of employment, hours, and pay rate. None of the job
characteristics was found to be related to voting behavior, and, of the demo-
graphic characteristics, only sex was related significantly to vote and then
only in election B,8 where the women were more inclined to vote for the
union than the men.9 While there do not appear to be really important rela-
tionships between demographic or job characteristics and vote in either of
the elections, the variance of these variables was restricted. Low level but
general relationships may emerge across elections.
C. Relationship Between Attitudes and Vote
We measure attitudes about unions by asking each employee to agree or
disagree with the following statements:
as bargaining representative signed by at least 30% of the employees. Often a union will
attempt to get more, either to insure victory or to set up the possibility of a bargaining
order pursuant to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 595 (1969).
8 The second of the two elections on which the findings reported in this article were
based.
9The correlation between sex and vote was .31, significant beyond the .0S level (i.e.,
the probability that this correlation was due solely to random factors was less than S
per cent).
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a) Organized labor is becoming too strong.
b) Unions ensure fair treatment of employees on matters such as promotion,
pay, and seniority rights.
c) Unions help the working man to get better wages and hours.
d) Unions interfere with good relations between employees and employers.
e) Unions have been responsible for many of the laws that benefit working people.
f) Many union leaders are corrupt.
g) Unions provide the employee with a voice in determining wages, hours, and
working conditions so that these decisions are not made by the employer alone.
h) Union dues and initiation fees are too high.
i) Unions hardly ever call unnecessary strikes.
j) Unions are a major cause of inflation.
We form a Union Attitude Index (UAI) for each respondent by summing
his responses to the ten items.10 We also ask employees to evaluate their
work situation by indicating whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with
each of the following aspects of their job:
a) Wages.
b) Hours.
c) Type of work.
d) Job security.
e) Fringe benefits, for example, vacations, holiday pay, insurance, sick leave.
f) The treatment of employees by company management.
g) The company's recognition of good work.
h) The company's efficiency.
The Job Satisfaction Index (JSI) represents the sum of the responses to these
eight items.1
Intent to vote for or against the union is measured both directly and in-
directly at the first interview. Direct measures include questions asking
whether or not the employee has signed a union authorization card and what
his voting intention is at this stage of the campaign. Each employee is also
asked, "If the election were held tomorrow, would you vote for or against the
Union." Responses are coded "for the Union," "against the Union" or "uncer-
tain." Questions asked on the first interview that measure vote intent less
directly include:
4. If for some reason you were to decide to quit your job with this Company,
10 The reliability of the UAI, estimated using KR 21 as a measure of internal con-
sistency (G. F. Kuder & M. W. Richardson, The Theory of Estimation of Test Reliability,
2 Psychometrika 150-160 (1937)), was .61 in election A and .70 in election B. These figures
indicate that the respondents are answering our union attitude questions in a generally
consistent fashion.
11 The reliability estimates (KR 21) for the JSI were .68 for election A and .80 for
election B.
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do you think it would be easy or difficult for you to find as good a job else-
where?
Easy ................................................. 1
D ifficult .............................................. 2
(Don't know) ......................................... 8
22a. Have you participated in any way in the election campaign?
Yes .......................................... 2
N o ................................................... 1
25. Regardless of the way you intend to vote, do you think a majority of the
voters will or wil not choose Union representation?
W ill choose Union ..................................... 3
W ill not choose Union .................................. 1
(Don't know) ......................................... 2
27. Do you think it would be a good thing or a bad thing if the Union were
voted in?
Good ............................................... 3
Bad .................................................. 1
(Don't know) ......................................... 2
30. How much have you talked to your friends at work about the election?
Very much ............................................ 4
Some ......................................... 3
Very little ............................................ 2
N one ................................................. 1
31. How many, if any, of your friends at work do you think will vote for the
Union-most, some, only a few, or none of them?
M ost ................................................. 4
Som e ................................................. 3
Only a few ............................................ 2
N one ................................................. 1
(Don't know) ......................................... 8
Tables I and 2 present the significant correlations between the attitudinal
data collected at the initial interview and the votes in elections A and B.
The tables show a high degree of correspondence across these two elections
despite very different unit characteristics.1 2 In both elections a positive
attitude towards unions in general was highly related to a vote for the union
(A r - .47; B r -. 58); high job satisfaction was related to a vote against
the union (Ar .58; B r = -. 58). The significant correlations between
card sign and vote (A r = .75; B r = .53) and vote intent and vote (A r =
.56; Br= .73) show that signing a union card or indicating an intent to
12 Election A, which took place in a medium-sized midwestern city, was conducted in
two stores of a large discount department-store chain. The Retail Clerks lost this election,
112 to 50. Election B involved employees of a manufacturing company in Chicago. The
Steelworkers lost this election, 183-93.
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TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INITIAL INTERVIEW DATA AND VOTE-ELECnION A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Participation
in election
campaign 1.00
2. Opinion as to
desirability of
Union victory .39 1.00
3. Vote intent .30 .63 1.00
4. Amount of
discussion
about election .48 .21 .17 1.00
5. Prediction of
friends' vote .32 .58 .50 .24 1.00
6. Card sign .55 .59 .48 .32 51 1.00
7. UAI .43 .48 52 .43 .20 .57 1.00
8. JSI -. 40 -. 54 -. 44 -. 34 -. 54 -. 65 -. 33 1.00
9. Vote .66 .59 .46 .51 .47 .75 .47 -. 58 1.00
Note: r=.29; p-.OS; N=46.n
vote for or against the union prior to the election campaign is highly predic-
tive of vote. Other evidence that an employee is likely to vote for the union
is that he participated in the early stages of the union campaign, discussed
the election with his friends, believes that a union victory would be de-
sirable and believes that his friends or a majority of the unit will vote for the
union.
The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 identify a dear trend: an em-
ployee's voting behavior is consistent with his attitudes, voting intent and
precampaign behavior. This trend is present in both elections and is typical
of all six pretest elections that we have completed.
The exploratory analyses described above demonstrate that stable rela-
tionships do exist between vote and precampaign attitudes, behavior and in-
tent. Multiple regression was used in the second stage of analysis in an
attempt to predict an employee's vote from his precampaign attitudes towards
the job and unions in general. 14 Table 3 indicates the accuracy of the cross-
Is The correlation coefficients in Tables I and 2 may be interpreted as follows: Vote
was scored so that a high score represented a vote for the union, a low score a vote
against the union. High positive correlations between data collected in the preliminary
interview and vote indicate that individuals who give a high score response to an item
tend to be union voters. High negative correlations indicate that individuals who give a high
score response on the item tend to vote against the union. For example, employees who
are highly satisfied with their jobs tend to vote against the union, reflected by the high
negative correlation between JSI and vote.
14 Multiple regression is a procedure for determining the relationship between a
criterion, vote, and combination of predictors. Maurice M. Tatsuoka, Validation Studies,
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TABLE 3
CROSS VALIDATED VOTM PREDCTIONS
Election A
Predicted Vote
For Union Against Union Totals
Actual For Union 16 2 18
Vote Against Union 7 21 28
Totals 23 23 46
Election B
Predicted Vote
For Union Against Union Totals
Actual For Union 20 7 27
Vote Against Union 4 33 37
Totals 24 40 64
TABLE 4
PREDICTIONS OF SWIrCHEXS
Election A
Predicted Vote
For Against Totals
Actual For 0 0 0
Vote Against 5 8 13
Totals 5 8 13
Election B
Predicted Vote
For Against Totals
Actual For 0 1 1
Vote Against 2 4 6
Totals 2 7
(Inst. for Personality & Ability Testing, Champaign, Bl., Selected Topics in Advanced
Statistics, No. 5, 1969). The multiple correlation predicting vote from union and company
attitudes in election A was .65 and in election B, .63. Since multiple linear regression
maximizes the prediction within each election, the cross-validated multiple correlations .62
in election A and .59 in election B give a more accurate estimate of the strength of the
relationship between prior attitudes and vote. The individual predictions (Tables 3 and
4) were determined by a cross-validated classification technique. William W. Cooley &
Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences (1962). UAI and JSI
mean scores of the groups voting for and against the union in one election are compared
to mean scores in another election. An employee is predicted to vote in the same way as
the group that his scores most resemble.
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validated predictions. In election A the votes of 37 of 46 employees were
predicted correctly, and in election B 53 of 64, on the basis of precampaign
union and company attitude data only. Table 4 indicates that in many cases
an employee's actual vote is predictable from his precampaign attitudes
even though he voted differently from his original intention. In election A
the votes of 8 of 13 switchers were correctly predicted; in election B 4 of 6.15
We were thus able to predict the votes of more than 80 per cent of the
electorate, including switchers, solely on the basis of voting intentions and
precampaign attitudes towards unions in general and the company. This
suggests that for the great bulk of the employees the campaign may not
be significant in altering an initial predisposition to vote for or against union
representation. That is not to say that the campaign does not strengthen that
predisposition; but it does not appear to change it. The votes of the approx-
imately 20 per cent whose prior attitudes were not predictive of their voting
behavior are more likely to have been influenced by the campaign. Accord-
ingly, in analyzing the extent to which employees appear to have been in-
fluenced by the campaign we shall focus on those respondents.
D. Relationship Between Campaign Familiarity and Vote
The Board assumes that employees generally are attentive to the cam-
paign and that vote switching is a product of the campaign. One way of test-
ing the Board's hypotheses is by measuring campaign familiarity and
comparing the familiarity of union voters, company voters and switchers.
Another is by correlating perception of individual campaign issues and vote.
To determine employees' familiarity with the campaigns of the parties, we
proceed in the following fashion. After the election we interview company
and union officials involved in the campaign, obtain copies of all their lit-
erature and speeches, and identify the major themes and arguments used by
each side during the campaign. We then code the campaign using a three-
digit code that contains numerical equivalents for almost any possible cam-
paign statement or action by either side. The code contains more than 350
categories1 6
15 These were employees who switched from initially supporting the union to voting
against it. We failed to predict the vote of one employee in election B who reported an
intention to vote against union representation and an ultimate vote for the union. The
rather gross inconsistencies between this employee's attitudes and ultimate vote led us to
suspect that he might be lying as to vote, but in the absence of proof to this effect we
have accepted his report of how he voted.
16 For example, Series 100 of the code-harmful economic consequences of unionization
-contains Series 130, plant dosing.
130 Plant closing will/may take place in retaliation for union victory.
131 Plant closing will/may take place because employer will not be able to afford to
operate with the union because of economic impact.
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We also code each employee's responses to questions concerning the cam-
paign and on the basis of these coded responses construct both a specific
and general campaign familiarity index for each employee. An employee's
specific company campaign index is the percentage of company campaign
issues that he identified in detail. His general company campaign index is the
percentage of company issues that he recalled generally. The union indices
are similarly constructed.
The company campaign in election A emphasized the effects on the em-
ployees of possible strikes if the union won, and alleged that unionization
was unnecessary, especially in such a small company, and might cause a loss
of individual treatment; that union dues, initiation fees and assessments were
too high; that unions were not concerned with the welfare of the employees
and contributed to inflation; and that union pay rates might make it necest-
sary for the employer to discharge employees. The company familiarity in-
dices were based on twelve specific issues. The union campaign in election
A consisted of a single, main issue-wages, and a secondary issue-union
strength.
Both the company and the union campaigns in election B were much more
detailed. Forty-five specific issues were identified in the company campaign,
including the harmful effects of unionization on customers; the possibility of
strikes, and loss of jobs and wages; the claim that unionization was unneces-
sary and might affect employer-employee relationships; criticisms of the union
movement; and unions' alleged lack of concern about employees, inability to
deliver on promises they made, etc. The union campaign in election B em-
phasized detailed issues of wages, pensions, sick leave, insurance, union
strength, union democracy, and union success in other settings, and alleged
that unions do not call unnecessary strikes.
Tables 5 and 6 present the mean percentages on the campaign familiarity
indices. The same general trends appeared in both elections. Initially, the
level of familiarity with the issues of the campaigns was low. Union voters
were slightly more familiar with both company and union campaigns than
those who voted against 'the union. The switchers in both campaigns-95
per cent of whom voted against the union-were less familiar with the com-
pany campaign than any other voting group. While the difference is statis-
tically significant only in election A, clearly our findings do not support the
Board's hypothesis that switching is a product of the campaign.17
In comparing the campaign familiarity of those whose votes were suc-
132 Plant closing will/may take place for reasons unknown/unspecified.
133 Plant closing has taken place at other plants after union victory.
17 The correlation between lack of familiarity with the issues of the campaign and vote
switch has also been noted in the political arena. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson
& Hazel Gaudet, supra note 6, at 69.
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TABLE S
CAwP=N FAxuaARx y N MwAN PERc:AcRS-ELwcnoN A
Company Company Union
Specific General General N
Total Unit 12.30 18.78 54.35 46
For Union 14.39 20.50 61.11 18
Against Union 10.96 17.68 50.00 28
Switchers 8.69 14.54* 50.00 13
Nonswitchefs 13.73 20.45 56.06 33
Predicted for Union/
Voted for Union 14.62 20.25 65.62 16
Predicted for Union/
Voted against Union 9.14 19.28 42.86 7
Predicted against Union/
Voted against Union 11.57 17.14 52.38 21
Predicted against Union/
Voted for Union 12.50 22.50 25.00 2
Sinificant p .03.
TABLE 6
CAMAIM FAM R= n; MUN PERCNTAGS--ELCTo B
Company Company Union Union
Specific General Specific General N
Total Unit 5.06 11.02 5.69 13.36 64
For Union 5.07 11.5 6,07 16.00* 27
Against Union 5.05 10.62 5.40 11.43 37
Switchers 4.29 9.14 5.14 9.00 7
Nonswitchers 5.16 11.24 5.75 13.89 57
Predicted for Union/
Voted for Union 5.00 11.80 6.60 17.55 20
Predicted for Union/
Voted against Union 4,50 9.50 6.00 13.50 4
Predicted against Union/
Voted against Union 5.12 10.76 533 11.18 33
Predicted against Uion/
Voted for Union 5.28 10.86 4.57 11.57 7
* Sificant p 6 .0.
cessfully predicted with those whose votes were not, we found no statistically
significant difference. Those employees who we predicted would vote for the
union, but who voted against, showed no greater familiarity with the com-
pany campaign than did those who we correctly predicted would vote for the
union. Thus, where precampaign attitudes are not predictive of vote, the
reason for the lack of predictability does not appear to be related to the
campaign.
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E. Relationship Between Unlawful Conduct and Vote
We are particularly interested in measuring the impact of statements and
actions that the Board currently regards as unfair labor practices or grounds
on which to set aside the results of an election. Accordingly, we sought in
our test studies to correlate employee perceptions of such statements and
actions with vote. In the second wave of interviews, we ask a series of ques-
tions about what each party has said and done during the campaign and
note all responses that the Board would regard as indicating that unlawful
statements or actions have occurred. We also ask the respondent why he and
other employees voted as they did, on the chance that some employees might
report as a reason for their vote, or the vote of others, campaign statements
or conduct not mentioned in response to our direct questions. Finally, we ask
each employee directly whether the employer has utilized either threats or
acts of reprisal, promises, or grants of benefit.
In determining whether unlawful conduct has actually taken place, we
rely in part on decisions of the Labor Board or its Regional Directors and
in part on our own investigation and analysis. If unfair labor practice charges
or objections to the election are filed, we regard the official disposition of
those charges as determinative of the legality of the conduct involved. Fre-
quently, however, charges or objections will not be filed even though conduct
has occurred that is arguably or even clearly unlawful. The losing party may
be unaware of the conduct in question or its unlawfulness, and if the elec-
tion was lost by a wide margin, may be uninterested in the possibility of ob-
taining a rerun or even a bargaining order. And the winning party is unlikely
to protest the loser's election practices since the only remedy in such a case
would be a cease and desist order of little practical value.
Where charges are not filed, we make our own determination as to legality
after reading the campaign literature and reading or listening to the speeches
each party made.18 In neither election A nor election B did the Board
find that unlawful conduct occurred. 19 In both, however, we concluded that
Is Where tape recordings of the speeches are available the parties generally provide us
with them. In our post-election interviews with employer and union representatives we
seek information as to all aspects of the campaign, including those of doubtful legality.
Full disclosure is encouraged by our promise to protect the anonymity of all employers
and unions involved. We do not attempt to resolve conflicts of testimony between
employees and representatives of the parties as to what has been said or done unless we
have copies of the literature or speech involved. If employees report certain conduct not
initially mentioned to us by the employer or union representative, we will call the
attention of the relevant party to it to see whether his failure to report it was an over-
sight. If he denies it, we accept that denial.
19In A the union filed charges under National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1) & (3),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) & (3) (1970), alleging a discriminatory discharge and discrimina-
tory reductions in working hours, but the charge was dismissed by the Regional Director
for lack of supporting evidence.
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employer statements, not called to the Board's attention by the union, were
at least arguably unlawful. In each case, the statement, although phrased
slightly differently, was essentially the same: if the union won the election,
employees would lose their right to discuss problems individually with man-
agement. Thus, in A the company said, inter alia, "Once you have a union
the company by law can no longer talk or deal with you on an individual
basis about your terms and conditions of employment .... Now, whenever
you have an individual problem, you can talk directly to us about it .... If
you decide that you want a union to do your talking for you, however, this
won't be possible." Similarly, in B, the employer said that if the union won,
employees "will absolutely lose their right to discuss wages, hours and working
conditions with management. No one will be able to discuss privately with
management their own personal cases regarding wages, hours and working
conditions." Although Board decisions concerning assertions of this type are
not wholly consistent, it is likely that the Board would find these statements
violative of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.20 In any
event, these statements, whether unlawful or not, are sufficiently close to the
line of illegality that their impact on the voters deserves careful analysis.
Tables 7 and 8 present the average number of employer unfair practices
reported by employees in elections A and B. The 46 employees interviewed
in A reported a total of 33 employer unfair labor practices. There were no
reports of unlawful conduct by the union. It was reported that the employer
had stated that economic benefits might be cut in retaliation for union vic-
tory (one mention); that he might fire strikers (two); and that unionization
might lead to loss of individual freedom to deal directly with the employer
(24). The employees also mentioned that the employer discharged employees
because of union activity (one); tried to find out which employees supported
the union (two); and granted benefits to employees to discourage union
activity (three).
The 64 employees interviewed in election B reported a total of 38 employer
unfair practices (again, there were no reports of union unfair practices). Em-
ployees reported that the employer had threatened to discharge or inflict
other economic injury on employees in retaliation for a union victory (four
mentions) and had stated that unionization might lead to a loss of individual
freedom to discuss problems with the employer (three) and would make a
2 0 See Saticoy Meat Packing Co., 182 NLRB 104 (1970); Block-Southland Sportswear,
Inc., 170 NLRB 936 (1968); Wimn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 166 NLRB 227 (1967); Graber
Mfg. Co., 158 NLRB 244 (1966). But see C & K Coal Co., 195 NLRB No. 196 (1972);
Bostich Division of Textron, Inc., 176 NLRB No. 47 (1969). The theory on which such
statements have been held unlawful is that they convey an implied threat of loss of the
employees' right under National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970),
to present grievances directly to the employer and to have those grievances adjusted with-
out the intervention of the bargaining representative.
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE NUmBER OF EMPLOYER UNFAiR LABR PRAcniczs--ExzcnoN A
Reprisals Benefits Total N
Total Unit .65 .06 .72 46
For Union .67 .11 .78 18
Against Union .64 .04 .68 28
Switchers against Union .54 .08 .62 13
Nonswitchers .69 .06 .76 33
Prediction Errors .67 .11 .78 9
Correct Predictions .65 .05 .70 37
Predicted for Union/
Voted for Union .75 .12 £8 16
Predicted for Union/
Voted against Union £6 .14 1.00 7
Predicted against Union/
Voted against Union .57 .00 .7 21
Predicted against Union!
Voted for Union .00 .00 .00 2
TABLE 8
AVERAGE NUMER OF EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRA c cs-ELMoN B
Reprisals Benefits Total N
Total Unit 30 .30 .59 64
For Union .52 .63 1.15 27
Against Union .14 .05 .19 37
Switchers .14 .14 .28 7
Nonswitchers .32 .32 .64 57
Switchers against Union .17 .00 .17 6
Switchers for Union .00 .14 .14 1
Prediction Errors .36 .18 .54 11
Correct Predictions .28 .32 .60 53
Predicted for Union/
Voted for Union .60 .75 1.35 20
Predicted for Union/
Voted against Union .50 .00 .s0 4
Predicted against Union/
Voted against Union .09 .06 .15 33
Predicted against Union/
Voted for Union .28 .28 .57 7
strike inevitable (three). Employees also reported that the employer had
interrogated employees about their grievances (one) and about why they
supported the union (one). Five employees stated that the employer treated
employees harshly to discourage union activity.
In both elections, those employees who voted against union representation
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tended to report fewer unfair practices than those who voted for union rep-
resentation. Switchers reported no more unfair practices than nonswitchers.
Most significantly, those employees who switched from an original intention
to vote for the union to an ultimate vote against the union in election B
reported far fewer unfair practices than union voters, and in election A
slightly fewer unfair practices than union voters.
These findings cast doubt on the Board's assumption that employees who
perceive the employer as having taken or threatened reprisals against union
supporters or as having granted or promised benefits to discourage union
support are likely to vote against the union even though they originally
favored union representation. Our data are more consistent with the hypothe-
sis that employees are not influenced by benefits or the promise of benefits
and that if they think the employer likely to take reprisals against union
supporters they will conclude that the possibility of retaliation would be less
if the union won the election, so they will be motivated to vote for the union.
We found almost no difference in the relative unfair labor practice percep-
tions of those employees whose precampaign attitudes were predictive of their
voting behavior and those whose attitudes were not. Those employees who
we predicted would vote for the union on the basis of their precampaign
attitudes but who in fact voted against union representation reported just
about the same number of unfair practices as those whose attitudes were
predictive of their vote for the union. Thus our prediction errors do not ap-
pear to have been caused by employee perception of unfair practices.
There was no greater correlation between perception of actual unfair prac-
tides and vote than there was between those unfair labor practices not found
by us but perceived by employees and vote. In election A, there were many
more reports of actual unfair labor practices than of imagined but the reports
were distributed almost equally between those who voted for and against the
union. In-election B, the actual unfair practice was mentioned no more than
the imagined and did not correlate significantly with vote. Of course, all of
this is most tentative because of the relatively small numbers of employees
involved and because the unfair practices were marginal in both elections.
In using reported perceptions as a measure of the effectiveness of campaign
tactics, we are assuming that employees honestly report to us what they re-
call and that what is recalled is more likely than what is forgotten to have
played a significant role in shaping voting intent. It is arguable that these
assumptions are invalid. Perhaps employees affected by the campaign are
unwilling to report honestly what they remember. Those coerced by the em-
ployer may be especially reticent. They may repress their recollection of
threatening or coercive behavior because they do not want to recognize that
their vote is attributable to fear.
While it is difficult to disprove this alternative hypothesis, there is much in
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our test studies inconsistent with it. The most sensitive questions we ask are
those relating to voting and to signing a union authorization card: the
answers to these questions, if known to the employer, could provide him with
a basis for deciding against whom to take retaliatory action. Nonetheless,
comparison of the answers given to the vote question by our sample with the
total vote and comparison of the answers to the card-signing question with
the union's list of card signers indicates that these questions are being answered
honestly by all but a tiny proportion of the employees. It would be surprising
if employees were willing to answer honestly highly sensitive questions about
their own behavior while withholding information in response to questions that
merely asked what the employer had said or done.
To be sure, that employees are willing to answer "sensitive" questions
honestly does not necessarily mean that they will not repress perceptions of
which they are ashamed, such as awareness of employer threats or promises
that have dissuaded them from voting for the union. Therefore, we also ask
each respondent why other employees voted against the union, on the
assumption that employees unwilling to talk of their own fear of reprisal or
expectation of benefits would be more willing to mention these factors as an
explanation of the conduct of others. The answers to this question have not
indicated a reservoir of repressed perception of unlawful conduct on the part
of employees voting against union representation. Those who attribute the
votes of others against the union to fear of reprisal or hope of benefits turn
out to be far more likely themselves to have voted for the union than against
it.
As our sample of elections studied increases, we will be able to analyze the
impact of unlawful conduct across, as well as within, elections. For example,
we will observe how the occurrence of unlawful conduct affects our ability to
predict voting in the unit as a whole. If we can predict more accurately in
legal elections, that would suggest that unfair labor practices may have an
effect not discernible in individual employee responses to our questions about
the campaign. If we predict that more employees will vote in favor of union
representation than ultimately do so, that would suggest that the unfair labor
practices discouraged employees from voting for the union; if we predict that
fewer employees will vote for union representation than actually do so, that
would suggest the reverse.
For some conduct currently regarded by the Board as illegal, there is an
antecedent question: are employees likely to perceive intimations of employer
retaliation in statements that vaguely suggest that unionization will be harm-
ful to the employee? The Board assumes that where the employer makes
statements about the results of unionization, a significant number of em-
ployees will conclude that management is threatening them with reprisals
should the union win. We plan to compare elections in which the company
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makes such statements with those in which it does not. If no greater aware-
ness of the possibility of retaliation is reported in the former than in the
latter, it would suggest that employees are less attuned to the nuances of
employer statements than Board doctrine would suggest. If greater awareness
of the possibility of retaliation is reported, but primarily by union supporters,
it may show that such tactics hurt the employer's campaign by convincing the
employees that they need a union to protect them. This would be an especially
persuasive inference if in such cases employees whose precampaign attitudes
suggested a vote against the union ended up voting in favor of it.
IV. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
Our test results suggest some of the ways in which the study, when com-
pleted, may provide support for modifying current rules. If, as our preliminary
results indicate, employees are not particularly attentive to the campaign and
are not quick to catch nuances of coercion, the Board should hesitate to find
unfair labor practices, and overturn elections, on the basis of ambiguous
employer speeches. Should our data suggest greater familiarity with the em-
ployer's campaign than the union's campaign, one could argue that rules
giving the union access to the employees during the campaign should be
strengthened.
There is a good deal of confusion concerning the circumstances under
which it is proper for the Board to order an employer to bargain with a
union that has lost its majority status after the commission of unfair labor
practices. The problem ultimately centers about the inability of either the
Board or the courts to make findings as to the likelihood that the loss of
majority was caused by the unfair labor practices.3 Our study can help
resolve the issue by delineating the circumstances under which unfair labor
practices tend to induce employees to vote against the union, and the magni-
tude of the effect. Bargaining orders should be limited to those cases in which
the union's election defeat is by a margin within the area of possible unfair
labor practice impact.
Recent judicial opinions suggest that the Board should consider such
factors as employee age or skill and plant location in deciding whether to
issue a bargaining order.Y2 Thus far our study has not shown that these or
other demographic factors significantly affect employee susceptibility to un-
lawful conduct. Perhaps, therefore, decisions as to whether a bargaining order
should be issued ought to be based solely on the unfair labor practices in-
volved and the margin of union defeat, without regard to the demographic
characteristics of the employees.
21 See Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, Bargaining Orders and the Myth of
NLRB Expertise, supra note 3.
22 See, e.g., NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 1971).
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V. EFFECT OF TEST STUDIES ON FINAL RESEARCH DESIGN
Pretesting is a necessary stage of empirical research. Our experience in
studying and analyzing the test elections has greatly influenced the pro-
cedures we are utilizing in the final stage of the research. Although the
original research design drew heavily on standard survey research methods, we
soon realized that they are not panaceas for problems encountered in a par-
ticular study. The remainder of this paper is devoted to a discussion of some
of the problems that arose in the pretests and how we have dealt with those
problems in constructing our final research design.
A. Choosing EJections to Study
1. Size of the sample. Our original research design contemplated a sample
of 50 elections and approximately 2000 respondents. Considerations of time
and money, however, have required that this goal be reduced to a maximum of
35 elections and 1500 respondents. 2 We believe, however, that a study of 35
elections, if wisely chosen, will provide us with a satisfactory sample of
different campaign tactics in a variety of industries and communities.
2. Nature of the pre-election campaign. Our scheme of analysis requires
us to compare voting behavior in legal and illegal campaigns. Because we
choose an election for study prior to the onset of the campaign, in order to
have enough examples of illegal behavior for our purposes we must be able
to predict in advance when illegality is likely to occur. 24 During the pretest
stage we based our prediction on the answers to the following questions: (1)
Does the law firm representing the employer have a reputation in the labor
relations community for counselng employers who wish to campaign vigor,
ously? (2) Do the representatives of the employer and the union believe that
there will be a vigorous campaign? If the answers to both questions were yes
we gave serious consideration to studying the election involved, our premise
being that any vigorous campaign presents the likelihood, given the Board's
numerous election rules, of generating illegal behavior to study.
This approach has been only partly successful. We have been able to study
vigorous campaigns and those campaigns have included some unlawful
behavior, but we have found no flagrant violations of the law. This has
23 The average cost of studying an election is approximately $4,000. Major costs are
data collection (salaries of interviewers, field supervisor, project coordinator, travel and
lodging) ; data reduction (salary of a professional coder) ; and data processing (computer
time). We have found that if we are to proceed with careful attention to relevant detail,
we can study no more than two elections per month.
24We could learn little about the impact of illegal behavior by choosing elections in
which such behavior took place prior to our first wave of interviews, since in such a
situation we could not engage in the "before" and "after" measurement that is the essence
of the panel method.
VOTING STUDY: A PRELIMINARY REPORT
probably been due, at least in part, to our concentration on elections in which
the parties are counseled by lawyers having substantial experience in NLRB
elections, who are aware that blatantly illegal behavior may lead to a bargain-
ing order. We plan to study some elections in which the parties are not
represented by acknowledged experts in NLRB elections. Not only may this
provide us with more instances of illegal behavior to study, but we are inter-
ested in comparing the nature and extent of unlawful conduct in campaigns
involving experts and those not involving them.
3. Geographic considerations. One of the first decisions that we made was
to study elections solely in the Midwest rather than to seek a nationwide
sample. We did so reluctantly. It has been suggested that voters in the South,
who have less familiarity with unions, are particularly susceptible to employer
coercion and also are easily manipulated by a campaign based on racial issues.
In order to study elections in the South, however, we would have either to
train a special staff of interviewers or incur the costs involved in transporting
our current staff of interviewers hundreds or even thousands of miles for each
election. Neither course is financially feasible.
It is too early to tell whether the lack of a nationwide sample will signifi-
cantly affect the conclusions that can be drawn from our data. Our study
embraces a diverse region ranging from such highly industrialized and urban-
ized areas as, Chicago and Gary to the rural parts of Kentucky, Missouri and
southern Illinois and Indiana, which share many characteristics with some
parts of the South. If no significant differences in patterns of response are
noted among voters in these very different areas of the Midwest, it will sug-
gest that voter behavior does not significantly vary geographically.
B. Data Collection
1. Obtaining interviews. The claims that we can make concerning the
general applicability of our findings are substantially dependent on our
ability to obtain interviews with a representative sample of employees. This
involves two separate but related problems: first, identifying and locating
employees; second, getting them to consent to be interviewed by us.
The obvious source of information as to the identity and location of
employees eligible to vote in an NLRB election is the list of employee names
and addresses that the employer is required to furnish to the Board for
transmittal to the union.2b Initially we sought to convince the union in
elections we wished to study to make the list of employee names available
to us. Sometimes the union representative would request information about
the study and check with higher officials before granting approval, a process
2 5 See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 US. 759 (1969).
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that deterred us from studying some elections because of the delay involved.
Sometimes the union declined to cooperate for fear that the employer would
make a campaign issue of its doing so. 26
The fear expressed by union organizers that making the list available to
us might become a factor in the campaign was not wholly groundless. In
some of the elections we studied the employer did attack the union for its
cooperation with us and in those elections a significant percentage of em-
ployees refused to be interviewed, thereby undermining the validity of our
findings. Our data from such elections might not reveal the true impact of
coercion because employees who were frightened refused to talk with us.
We sought to eliminate the problems inherent in obtaining names and
addresses from either the employer or the union by requesting the Board to
make them available to us. The Board refused, contending that our study
represented an unwarranted invasion of employees' privacy, that we might
upset the "laboratory conditions" under which it seeks to conduct elections
and that at the very least our study would lead to the filing of unmeritorious
objections that would delay the Board in processing the election.
On August 6, 1970, we filed suit against the Board in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting that we were entitled
to the lists of employee names and addresses under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.27 The district court ordered the Board to make the lists available
to us and its decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. 28 In rejecting the Board's contentions, the court of
appeals concluded that there was no proof that our study would necessarily
interfere with the conduct of Board elections. The court also stated:
. . . [Ojur finding is that disclosure for purposes of appellees' study is dearly
warranted. The invasion of employee privacy strikes us as very minimal, and the
possible detrimental effects of the study in terms of delaying the election process as
highly speculative.2 9
20 Similar problems could be expected if we sought to obtain employee names and
addresses from the employer. Since he has power to affect the economic well being of
employees, it is crucial that the study be conducted as independently as possible of him.
If it became known that the employer made available to us the list of names and
addresses, some employees might doubt the independence of the study and might refuse
to cooperate or not answer truthfully. The same risk exists, although in lesser degree, when
the names come from the union.
27Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, amending Administrative
Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). Although Pub. L. No. 89-487 was
repealed, its substantive provisions were enacted into the United States Code by Act of
June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
28 Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Board requested the Supreme
Court to stay the district court's order, but its request was denied by Mr. Justice Black.
NLRB v. Getman, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971).
29 450 F.2d at 677.
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Accordingly, on August 31, 1971, nearly two years after we had requested
the Board to provide us with employee names and addresses, it was ordered
to do so. 0
Our success in the Freedom of Information Act litigation was a major
breakthrough in our efforts to maximize our response rate. We also developed
other procedures designed to achieve the same goal. At the pretest stage we
sent each employee a long letter describing the project, accompanied by a
newspaper article reporting our National Science Foundation grant and by a
two-page mimeographed document called "Some Answers to Your Questions."
The latter, written in question and answer form, contained answers to the
most common employee questions about the study. We assumed that by
providing the employees with this volume of material we would assure them of
our bona fides and increase the likelihood of obtaining an interview.
Our pretest experience, in which we discovered that the employees were
reading our material with no more care than the material sent out by the
parties, led to serious doubts about the value of our sending so much informa-
tion to the employees.31 These doubts were strengthened by discussions with
survey research experts who indicated their belief that providing a potential
respondent with considerable information before the interview did no more
than enable him to think of reasons for not being interviewed.3 2 We now send
each employee a letter telling him very briefly about the study and enclosing
the newspaper article reporting our NSF grants. We hope thus to pique his
curiosity and make him willing to listen to the interviewer when he calls for
an appointment.8u Additionally, we try to get an article about the study pub-
lished in the local newspaper a few days before we schedule the interviews.
Other survey researchers have found that such articles are extremely helpful
in obtaining cooperation from respondents."
8OFor a general discussion of the difficulties involved in obtaining information from
the government, see Joan M. Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 48 Texas L. Rev. 1261 (1970).
31 Such doubts were not lessened by the experience, common to our interviewers, of
introducing oneself at the door, referring to the study, its neutrality, confidentiality, etc.,
then having a wife call to her husband, "Joe, the guy from the union is here I"
'82 Conversations with Charles F. Cannel, Program Director, Survey Research Center,
University of Michigan, August, 1971. The use and nature of advance letters by a number
of survey research facilities is reported in 3 Survey Research, No. 7 (Survey Research
Laboratory, Univ. of Illinois, Summer 1971).
3 3 Another change from the pretest design is that the interviewer is authorized to
conduct the first wave interview over the telephone if the respondent prefers that to
arranging a peisonal interview. We discovered that some respondents who are reluctant to
have our interviewers visit their homes are perfectly willing to be interviewed by tele-
phone. Preliminary analysis shows no significant differences in either the quantity or
quality of the data obtained through telephone interviews as compared to personal
interviews.
34 R. Kahn & Charles Cannell, The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Technique and
Cases 66 (1961).
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We have spent a great deal of time since the pretests training our inter-
viewers in those techniques that we and others have found to be most effective
in obtaining an interview from an initially hesitant respondent. When a
potential respondent is doubtful, the interviewer is instructed to appeal to his
sense of altruism, 35 to convince him that he can contribute to a study that
will help other working people. At times the initial interviewer is unable to
obtain an interview, but suspects that his failure may be due to a personality
conflict with the respondent. In such situations the respondent is reassigned
to another interviewer.
We have studied four elections utilizing these new procedures. The results
have been most encouraging. Our overall refusal rate at the first-wave inter-
view has been only 9.5 per cent. In one election we had not a single refusal
in a sample of 34. Our second-wave refusal rate is only three per cent.
It has become clear to us and to our interviewers that almost all employees
enjoy the interview experience. We are interested in what they have to say;
we want to know how they feel about their job and about unionism. For many
employees our sincere interest in their ideas about this significant aspect of
their life is both a novel and pleasing experience.
2. Selecting and training interviewers. The role of the interviewer in
survey research is crucial. He has the ultimate responsibility for obtaining the
interview and the desired information. We learned in the course of the pre-
tests that our study imposed even greater demands than usual on the inter-
viewer. It is rare that a survey research project involves issues as sensitive as
does ours. It is equally rare in survey research to utilize as many open-ended
questions as we must in order to determine, with as much precision as pos-
sible, the employee's perception of what has been said and done during the
preelection campaign.
Our original staff of interviewers-housewives and undergraduate students
all of whom had considerable experience in survey research interviewing-
proved inadequate for our purposes. To some extent they appeared to lack
the persuasive skills necessary to obtain an interview, though that may have
been a function of the difficulties under which the study labored before we
were able to obtain employee names and addresses from the Board. It was
plain to us, however, that they were unable, despite extensive training, to
master the techniques of probing required by open-ended questions. For ex-
ample, in analyzing our first test studies, our ability to draw meaningful con-
clusions was often thwarted by the interviewer's failure to probe an ambiguous
response. Thus, an answer "The company said we would lose benefits if we
voted for the union," is difficult to use in analysis because it does not
3 5 See Stephen A. Richardson, Barbara Snell Dohrenwend & David Klein, Interviewing:
Its Forms and Functions 62-63 (1965).
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specify why benefits would be taken away. The coder cannot tell whether the
employee perceives the employer as threatening to take benefits away in
retaliation for a union victory or as anticipating that a union victory will have
a harmful effect on the operation of the business so that the employer will
be financially unable to maintain the existing level of employee benefits. The
interviewer must be trained to probe for further information. 6
We discovered after some experimentation that law students made ideal
interviewers for this study. There are several reasons why this is so. First, law
students are experts in taking down what other people say. Second, they are
attuned to the legal nuances of our project and capable of understanding
what we want from the respondents. Third, they are skilful at probing since
the question-and-answer form of dialogue has been an integral, indeed
dominant, part of their educational experience.87
3. Number of interviews. Our original research design, derived from the
political election studies, provided for four interviews with each voter. We
sought to identify shifts in voting intent during the campaign and to correlate
them with contemporaneous campaign tactics. It became apparent in the
course of the pretests that this scheme was unrealistic, primarily because the
typical NLRB election campaign lasts no more than one or two weeks. There
is little point to conducting the first few waves of interviews, designed to
measure the impact of the campaign, prior to the commencement of the
campaign. Nor would it be practical to jam three interviews into 7-14 days of
campaigning in the hope of relating vote shifts to campaign tactics. Not only
would employees be unlikely to consent to such frequent interviewing, but the
paucity of vote switching in such a brief period of time makes the costs of
the interviewing far outweigh the value of the data collected. Accordingly,
we decided in the latter stages of the pretests to conduct only one pre-
3 3 An appropriate probe in response to the statement mentioned above might be, "How
do you think.the loss of benefits might come about?" A probe that mentioned possibilities
such as "Did he say whether the loss of benefits might come in retaliation for union
victory?" would be leading and totally inappropriate. While the technique may sound
simple, it is difficult to implement in an actual situation for an interviewer who does not
understand clearly the objectives of the study.
S7 We have recruited three separate staffs of law student interviewers, one from
Indiana University to handle first wave interviews in elections in Indiana, Kentucky,
southern Illinois, and the St. Louis area; one from the University of Chicago and North-
western to handle first wave interviews in Northern Illinois and Iowa; and one from
the University of Illinois to handle second wave interviews by phone. Each of these
interviewers has had the benefit of considerable training both in the classroom and the
field. Training sessions have been conducted on techniques for getting the interview, how
to control the pace of the interview (in order to be able to record ali the respondent
says), when and how to probe, appropriate answers to questions that may arise during
an interview and how to set up a second wave interview. Additionally, we accompanied
interviewers on interviews during the pretest stage and conducted individual performance
evaluations with them.
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election interview, the purpose of which would be to measure precampaign
attitudes and vote intent and collect demographic data. Questions about the
campaign are limited to the post-election interview, which takes place
promptly after the election.38
We also gave serious consideration to omitting the preelection interview
altogether in favor of a research design that would consist solely of a single
post-election interview. The advantages of such a change would be manifold.
Since we would not have to choose an election for study until the campaign
was complete, we could be certain that we had a fair sample of both legal
and illegal campaign behavior. Employee cooperation might be easier to ob-
tain once the tensions of the campaign had dissipated. Finally, data collection
costs could be reduced substantially.
We decided to retain the panel design for one compelling reason-there is no
other means by which we could determine with certainty precampaign atti-
tudes and the voting intentions of employees, both of which are crucial to
our study. Were we to ask employees, after the election, what their attitudes
and voting intent had been prior to the campaign, we would have little
confidence in their answers. Either a faulty memory or an unwillingness to
admit to having changed his mind might deter an employee from reporting
prior attitudes or voting intent inconsistent with those held after the election.
Accordingly, we have chosen to retain the two-interview research design, one
before and one after the election campaign, as the most effective means of
determining attitudes and voting intent (or vote) at each stage.
4. Interview schedules. Just as our initial four-wave design was powerfully
influenced by the political election studies, so were our initial interview
schedules. Our current interview schedules, now in their eighth draft, have
been significantly changed as a result of our pretest experience. Some questions
have been dropped or rephrased because they were ambiguous or provoked hos-
tility.89 Other questions have been altered or added either because they did
not elicit the data we needed to test existing hypotheses40 or because the
pretests suggested new hypotheses that we wished to explore.41
38 The great bulk of the second wave interviews take place within 24 hours of the election
and all but a very few within 72 hours.
89 0ne example of a question, the ambiguity of which appears obvious in hindsight,
was this: "Unions hardly ever call unnecessary strikes. Do you agree or disagree?"
Many respondents, quite understandably, had trouble unscrambling the negatives on that
question, which we revised to read, "When a strike is called, it is generally for a good
reason. Agree or disagree?".
4 We originally asked all employees who signed union authorization cards: "If you
can remember, what was your reason for signing the card?" The hypothesis to be tested
is that employees who sign union cards do so because they want union representation.
Pretesting revealed that an employee might answer the question by saying, "Everybody
else was signing." In analyzing such answers, we realized that we did not know whether
an employee who gave us such an answer signed only because everyone else was doing so
VOTING STUDY: A PRELIMINARY REPORT
C. Data Reduction
In order to test our hypotheses about the effect of the campaign, we must
quantify responses to our open-ended questions. This procedure, known as
content analysis or coding, reduces verbal responses to essentials and groups
similar responses into a standard set of categories that are represented numeri-
cally. 2 The development of these standard categories enables us to code each
employee's responses in such a way that we can compare perceptions of the
campaign among various groups of employees within a particular election as
well as compare campaign content across elections.
Although the development of standard coding categories for open-ended
questions is always difficult, the character of our study presents particular
problems. Our code must be able to cope with a wide range of possible re-
sponses at a high level of specificity. In an active campaign, the number of
possible responses to a question such as "What did the employer say in his
letters or other written material?" is enormous. Furthermore, since we are
testing the Board's hypothesis that employees recall with specificity what has
been said, categories available for employee responses must be similarly spe-
cific. At the same time the categories must not be so specific that the value of
combining answers for purposes of statistical analysis is lost. Finally, the
categories must not overlap, lest the decision where to place a particular
answer become arbitrary.
We began with a code that we thought contained appropriate categories for
most of the answers we were likely to elicit. Some categories have since been
added to take account of responses we had not anticipated; others have been
or also because he wanted union representation. We now ask all card-signers: "At the
time you signed the card, did you or did you not want the Union to get in at the
Company?".
41 In the pretest stage, we noted a persistent relationship between the amount of
reported discussion with friends about the union or the election and vote. Those em-
ployees who reported a substantial amount of discussion tended to be union supporters.
This suggested the hypothesis that employees who did not support the union were those
employees who were isolated from the life of the plant, and, as a result of their isolation,
were not inclined to participate in the employee-based union movement. Alternatively, it
is possible that those employees who were predisposed to vote against the union tended
not to participate in plant discussions about the union either because their minds were
made up or because there was no active group of anti-union employees with whom to
discuss their anti-union sentiments. In order to determine whether the anti-union em-
ployee is isolated from plant society, we added the following question: "On the whole,
would you describe the people you work with as friendly or not friendly?". Presumably,
an employee who is integrated into the plant society will see his fellow workers as
friendly, the isolated employee will see them as not friendly.
42 See Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (1952); A
Manual for Coders: Content Analysis at the Survey Research Center (Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan, 1961).
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combined because we found that neither professional coders nor we4" could
satisfactorily distinguish between them in attempting to categorize the answers
to our questions. For example, an early version of the code contained, as
possible statements as to why the employees should favor unionization, the
following two categories:
830 = Union Strength: strength of union will balance employer strength.
860 = Participation in Employer Decision: Union will provide employees with
voice in determining wages/hours/working conditions; important decisions
will not be made by employer alone.
The categories were, we thought, analytically distinguishable, the former
emphasizing the increase in employee power vis-A&-vis the employer flowing
from unionization, the latter emphasizing the democratic procedures that
unionization could be said to entail. In the event, the distinction proved too
subtle to be useful as we frequently could not decide which of these aspects of
unionization the employee was referring to when he said, for example, "We
would be better off with collective bargaining" or "The Union will stick up for
us." Accordingly, the two categories were combined.
In comparing actual answers with the code categories into which we sought
to place them it became apparent that much of the richness and variety of
employee comments is lost when they are reduced to their lowest common
denominator and placed in a particular code category. In interviewing em-
ployees we have been struck by how different flesh and blood workers are in
their responses from the simplistic model that the Labor Board's opinions
presuppose. The opinions often imply that employees are empty vials into
which the content of the campaign is poured. But in the interview process one
develops a definite sense that employees are evaluating the campaign state-
ments and actions in terms of their own individual values and beliefs. We
hope to be able to retain and convey some sense of the individuality of em-
ployee responses to our questions by recording and retaining the most
interesting and colorful for illustrative purposes.
4 3 All coding to date has been done by a professional survey coder. We have limited our
role to checking a random sample of answers coded by her, conferring with her on the
appropriate coding of borderline or novel responses, and working with her in the
development of new code categories.
